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A Fragment of Christology: Feminism as a Moment of 
Chalcedonian Humanism 
W. Chris Hackett 
Let	no	one	say	that	nothing	more	is	really	possible	in	this	field	any	longer.	
‐Rahner	
	
Abstract:	 This	 theological	 fragment	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 “humanist”	 (generally	
speaking)	 and	 “feminist”	 (particularly	 speaking)	 implications	 of	 classical	 Christology.	
Based	 on	 the	 exigencies	 of	 Christology,	 it	 proposes	 that	 the	 theological	 renewal	 of	
feminism	 ought	 to	 occur	 by	 integration	 into	 the	 broader	 horizon	 of	 the	 specific	
humanism	proffered	by	 classical	Christology,	 rightly	understood.	 It	makes	a	 first	 step,	
therefore,	towards	framing	the	conditions,	nothing	more,	for	a	rapprochement	between	
a	 “horizontal”	 liberation	 theology	 and	 a	 classical	 “vertical”	 soteriology.	Developing	 a	
constructive	 debate	 between	 the	 perspectives	 on	 Chalcedonian	 Christology	 by	 two	
contemporary	 theologians,	 Sarah	 Coakley	 and	 Aaron	 Riches,	 it	 proposes	 that	 their	
seemingly	 contradictory	Christologies	–	beginning,	 for	 the	 former,	 from	 the	duality	of	
natures,	and	 for	 the	 latter,	 from	 the	unity	 of	person	 –	possess	 similar	 intentions	 (the	
articulation	of	a	 theological	humanism)	but	opposing	 intuitions	about	how	 to	 realize	
such	a	project.	 It	 is	Riches’	 interpretation	 of	 the	human	 in	Christ	 that	must	 form	 the	
appropriate,	Christological	conditions	for	the	realization	of	Coakley’s	aspiration	towards	
an	authentic	religious	feminism.		
Key	 Words:	 Feminism;	 Theological	 Humanism;	 Christology;	 Chalcedon;	 Sarah	
Coakley;	Aaron	Riches	
	
n	his	now	classic	study	of	Maximus	the	Confessor,	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar	suggests	
that	Maximus	understood	the	meaning	of	humanity,	the	cosmos,	and	their	collective	
relation	 to	 God	 precisely	 through	 his	 “dyothelite”	 (two	 wills)	 approach	 to	 the	
Chalcedonian	 dogma.	 According	 to	 Balthasar,	 Maximus	 was	 therefore	 the	 “real	
predecessor	of	Aquinas”	in	his	particular	concern	to	preserve	the	difference	and	integrity	
of	 creaturely	 freedom,	 as	well	 as	 in	 his	 constructive	 account	 of	 that	 concern,	 which	 he	
purports	 is	 only	 possible	 through	 a	 “higher	 synthesis”	 achieved	within	 the	unity	 of	 God	
Godself.1	 Balthasar’s	 creative	 historical	 study	 of	 Maximus	 is	 meant	 to	 imply	 that	 for	
theology	today	as	well,	the	fundamental	question	of	the	relation	of	divinity	and	humanity	
as	such	is	best	approached	as	a	problem	proper	to	Christology,	and	answerable	through	a	
return,	once	again,	to	the	history	of	dogmatic	reflection.	Along	with	Maximus	and	Aquinas	
(and	Balthasar),	 two	 contemporary	 theologians	 in	 the	Western	 tradition,	 Sarah	 Coakley	
																																																													
1	Hans	Urs	von	Balthasar,	Cosmic	Liturgy:	The	Universe	According	to	Maximus	the	Confessor,	trans.	Brian	E.	
Daley,	S.	J.	(San	Francisco:	Ignatius,	2003),	69.	
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and	Aaron	Riches,	 have	 also	 returned	 to	 Chalcedon’s	 Christology	 as	 the	 proper	 starting	
point	 for	 constructive	 theological	 anthropology.	 Further,	 their	 questions	 crystallize	 in	 a	
similar	way	as	their	forebears	around	a	deep	concern	for	the	preservation	of	the	integrity	
of	humanity	in	the	encounter	with	God	and	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	the	incarnation	
for	 human	 spirituality	 and	 freedom.	 A	 look	 at	 the	 surprising	 convergences	 and	
divergences	 within	 their	 proper	 proposals	 will	 elucidate	 the	 specific	 problems	 of	
contemporary	 theology	 and	 create	 an	 opportunity	 for	 a	 renewed	 constructive	
Chalcedonian	“concentration”	for	contemporary	theological	anthropology.	The	debate	we	
shall	 construct	 between	 their	 proper	 approaches	 to	 Christology	 concerns	 precisely	 this:	
how	does	Christology	realize	a	vision	of	theological	humanism?	What	is	the	significance	of	
Chalcedon	for	specifically	contemporary	issues?	Using	the	issue	of	feminism	as	a	test	case,	
we	will	see	that	Chalcedonian	Christology’s	most	basic	contribution	is	the	soteriological	re‐
articulation	of	specific	social	concerns	and	projects.	Our	thesis	finally	crystallizes,	playing	
the	role,	for	this	essay,	of	final	cause:	A	Christian	approach	to	the	question	requires	the	re‐
tying	of	any	feminism	to	this	broader	religious	(Christological)	humanism	of	which	it	plays	
an	important	part.2		
CLASSICAL CHRISTOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 
A. According to Coakley 
(1) The Definition as Source 
	
In	 an	 important	 article	 published	 in	 2002,	 Sarah	 Coakley	 explores	 three	 divergent	
readings	of	the	Chalcedonian	Christological	Definition	of	451	(“to	be	acknowledged	in	two	
natures	 (physesin),	 inconfusedly,	 unchangeably,	 indivisibly,	 inseparably	 …	 concurring	 in	
one	person	and	one	subsistence	(hypostasis)”)3	for	contemporary	theological	reflection.	In	
light	of	the	limitations	she	finds	in	each	of	the	options	she	analyses,	she	proffers	a	fourth	
reading,	suggesting	that	 it	should	be	understood	in	a	“properly	apophatic”	way,	viz.,	 that	
the	 Definition,	 primarily	 negatively—and	 abstractly—defines	 the	 relation	 among	 the	
natures	 in	 the	 hypostasis,	 thereby	 only	 functioning	 as	 the	 “horizon”	 that	 circumscribes	
what	 can	 and	 cannot	 be	 said	 about	 Christ’s	 ontological	make‐up.4	 It	 is	 in	 this	 primarily	
negative	mode	that	she	understands	the	dogmatic	Definition	as	the	seminal	starting	point	
out	of	which	may	flower	theological	development.	She	proposes,	furthermore,	that	in	this	
negative	 Christology	 she	 is	 herself	 closer	 to	 the	 later	 Eastern	 tradition	 of	 faithful	 but	
creative	 thinking	 from	 within	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 Definition.	 Yet	 Coakley’s	 proposal	 is	 not	
purely	apophatic.	The	most	important	option	that	Coakley	critiques	in	her	fine	study,	the	
“linguistically	 regulatory”	 model,	 purported	 most	 eminently	 by	 Richard	 Norris,	 sees	
Chalcedon	solely	 in	a	 radically	apophatic	way,	 eschewing	any	and	all	positive	 content	of	
																																																													
2	Unfortunately,	I	cannot	develop	such	constructive	a	dialogue	with	feminist	theology	here.	In	a	larger	study	of	
which	this	is	a	portion,	I	develop	the	concrete	implications	of	this	refiguring	of	the	feminine	by	way	of	Mary	of	
Nazareth,	through	Sergei	Bulgakov’s	sophiological	Christology.	The	task	of	this	Christological	fragment	is	
merely	to	frame	the	conditions	by	which	such	refiguring	of	feminism	within	Christological	humanism	is	first	
made	intelligible	–	to	make	the	dialogue	possible.	
3	From	the	Confession	of	Chalcedon.	Emphasis	mine.	
4	Sarah	Coakley,	“What	Does	Chalcedon	Solve	and	What	Does	It	Not?	Some	Reflections	on	the	Status	and	
Meaning	of	the	Chalcedonian	‘Definition’,”	from	The	Incarnation:	An	Interdisciplinary	Symposium	on	the	
Incarnation	of	the	Son	of	God	ed.	Stephen	T.	Davis	et	al.	(NY:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002),	141‐163.		
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the	 Definition.5	 For	 Norris,	 the	 Definition,	 if	 seen	 as	 anything	 but	 a	 negative,	 linguistic	
solution	 to	 the	 central	 question	 of	 the	 simultaneity	 of	 divinity	 and	 humanity	 in	 Christ	
(which	it	accomplished	by	distinguishing	between,	but	not	adequately	defining,	physis	and	
hypostasis),	 will	 only	 serve	 to	 “reify”	 the	 two	 terms	 predicated	 of	 Christ	 as	 static	
substances,	 thereby	 degrading	 into	 an	 “onto‐theological”	 (my	 term)	 problematic	 which	
elides	 the	 fundamental	difference	between	 the	word	 “nature”	as	 it	 is	predicated	of	both	
divinity	and	humanity.	Coakley	concurs,	of	course,	with	this	view	in	a	limited	way.	Yet,	she	
sees	it	as	critically	problematical	for	the	following	reason:	the	merely	linguistic‐regulatory	
view	of	Chalcedon	is	rooted	in	Norris’	own	theological	assumptions,	which	Coakley	sees	to	
be	 rooted	 in	 an	 overly‐strong	 apophaticism	 that	 a	 priori	 questions	 the	 stability	 and	
veracity	of	any	enduring	kataphatic	element.	Now	if	one	takes	the	influence	of	post‐liberal	
thought	 on	 Norris	 seriously	 (as	 Coakley	 certainly	 does),	 then	 for	 Norris,	 dogmatic	
definitions	 are	 merely	 formal	 grammatical	 rules,	 meant	 to	 guide	 a	 community’s	 self‐
understanding:	 They	 are	 only	 “truth	 claims”	 in	 a	 limited	 sense;	 the	 question	 of	 their	
veracity	 can	only	be	articulated	 from	within	 the	 “orthodox”	 language	game,	by	one	who	
shares	the	same	commitments	and	liturgical	practices.	Coakley’s	problem	with	this	view,	
following	Brian	Daley,	is	that	there	is	no	evidence	that	for	the	pre‐	and	post‐Chalcedonian	
theologians	 language	 can	 be	 divorced	 from	 reality,	 i.e.,	 that	 “linguistic	 terms”	 can	 be	
																																																													
5	See	Richard	Norris,	“Chalcedon	Revisited:	A	Historical	and	Theological	Reflection”	New	Perspectives	in	
Historical	Theology:	Essays	in	Memory	of	John	Meyendorff	ed.	Bradley	Nassif	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Eerdmans,	
1996),	140‐158.	One	wonders	if	Norris	could	be	read	more	sympathetically:	Perhaps	his	highly	rhetorical	
apophaticism	cleanses	the	temple,	as	it	were,	in	order	for	Coakley—and	others—	to	offer	more	constructive	
accounts.	In	this	light	he	would	be	proposing,	albeit	in	a	negative	fashion,	a	more	radical	theological	
metaphysics	of	the	relation	between	God	and	the	world,	as	revealed	in	Christ	(or	at	least	the	opportunity	for	
such).	This	view	would	draw	Norris	closer	to	Thomas	Aquinas	than	George	Lindbeck	(for	Coakley’s	remarks	to	
the	contrary,	see	“What	does	Chalcedon	solve?”,	151).	For	this	see	especially	his	conclusion,	Norris,	“Chalcedon	
Revisited”,	157‐8.	Only	a	few	quotes	will	have	to	suffice	here:	“[T]here	is	no	overarching	category	in	which	
[God	and	creature]	can	be	classified.	‘God,’	if	the	monotheistic	hypothesis	is	correct,	does	not	fall	into	any	class,	
even	if	human	beings	do	…	And	to	the	extent	that	this	is	true,	then	the	sort	of	incompatibility	that	obtains	
between	contraries	cannot	be	thought	to	obtain	between	God	and	creatures.	It	is	in	failing	thoroughly	to	
explore	this	vertiginous	thought	that	both	classical	and	modern	christologies	have,	as	it	were,	spiked	the	gun	
of	their	sacred	physics”	(156).	“Thus	it	would	seem	that	a	negative	theology	is	best	interpreted	as	saying	
precisely	that	the	difference	between	God	and	humanity	is	a	matter	neither	of	contrariety	nor	of	contradiction,	
that	God	is	not	related	to	us	as	an	element	or	factor	or	reality	that	is	either	interchangeable	with	the	creature	
as	a	contrary	(i.e.,	a	different	thing	of	the	same	general	sort)	or	incompatible	with	the	creature	as	its	utter	
negation”	(157).	Norris	concludes	with	his	own	prescriptions	“[T]here	can	be	no	reason	to	talk	about	a	
‘Christ’”	and	the	incarnation	but	as	a	salvific	event,	which	therefore	necessitates	that	“a	relation	with	Christ	
entails	an	encounter	with	God”.	Likewise,	“to	talk	about	Christ	is	to	talk	about	one	whose	being	humans	share”.	
Therefore,	in	the	end,	the	Definition	“can	be	judged	merely	to	have	stated	the	terms	of	the	Christological	
problem”	(157‐8).	For	Norris,	this	“religiosity”,	christic	“humanism”	and	final	apophatic	reserve,	must	be	the	
core,	and	indeed,	“horizon”	if	you	like,	of	Christological	reflection:	“In	stating	the	‘terms	of	the	Christological	
problem,’	Chalcedon	…	defined	an	agenda	and	thus	posed	a	question.	And	the	question—the	challenge—was	
not	how	to	fit	two	logical	contraries	together	into	one,	as	its	ancient	and	modern	interpreters	have	all	but	
uniformly	supposed	[!],	but	how	to	dispense	with	a	binary	logic	in	figuring	the	relation	between	God	and	
creatures”	(158).	In	this	way	Norris	articulates	the	issue	in	a	strikingly	similar	way	to	Bulgakov	(see	below).	
From	here,	Norris	would	seem	to	make	available	or	possible—despite	his	harsh	dialectical	rhetoric—	quite	a	
constructive	account,	one	that	actually	concords	with	much	of	Coakley’s	own	proposal,	at	least	more	than	she	
seems	to	allow.	To	say,	as	Coakley	does,	that	Norris	makes	no	ontological	proposal,	is	misleading	(see.	Coakley,	
“What	does	Chalcedon	solve?”,	149).	Thus	his	conclusion	that	“it	is	the	Council	of	Chalcedon’s	Definition	…	that	
allows	room	for	such	a	conclusion	and	for	the	rethinking	to	which	it	might	lead”	(158),	that	the	Definition	itself	
is	“non‐committal”	about	the	relation—and	therefore	meaning—of	divine	and	human	natures	in	Christ	does	
not	reject,	but	rather	calls	for,	mindful	constructive	work	(italics	mine).	The	difference,	of	course,	is	critical.	
Norris’	assessment	of	the	extent	of	the	“onto‐theology”	of	the	“sacred	physics”	of	univocity	is	no	doubt	more	
radical	than	Coakley’s,	who	rightly	delimits	it	to	a	modern	genealogy.	Norris	seems	more	like	Heidegger	than	
he	ought.	This,	I	think,	is	the	fundamental	difference	between	Norris	and	Coakley.			
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divorced	 from	 “ontological	 commitments”.6	 Thus	 Norris’	 view	 is	 motored	 by	 an	
“anachronistic	 Lindbeckian	 engine”:	 he	 reads	 back	 into	 Chalcedon	 contemporary	 post‐
metaphysical	 problematics,	 which	 divorce	 language	 from	 reality,	 and	 from	 religious	
experience	 as	 well.7	 Norris	 allows	 his	 (so‐called)	 “post‐liberal”	 cultural‐linguistic	 anti‐
metaphysical	 commitments	 to	 adjudicate	 the	meaning	 of	 Chalcedon	 as	 such.	 As	 for	 the	
second	 and	 third	 views—subtly	 and	 generously	 analyzed	 by	 Coakley,	 viz.,	 first,	 that	 the	
Definition	 is	 merely	 “metaphorical,”	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 or,	 second,	 that	 it	 is	 just	 simply	
“literally	 true”	 and	 defines	 the	 identity	 of	 Christ	without	 ambiguity,	 on	 the	 other—they	
primarily	 suffer	 the	 same	 general	 critique	 as	 Norris:	 they	 eisegetically	make	 assertions	
about	Chalcedon	that	are	alien	to	the	fifth‐century	issues	surrounding	composition	of	the	
text.8	 John	 Hick’s	 “anti‐realist”	 assumption	 that	 only	 metaphor	 can	 safeguard	 the	
transcendence	of	God,	or	the	literalism	of	David	Brown	or	Thomas	Morris,	 for	whom	the	
ontological	reality	of	the	 incarnation	wholly	corresponds	to	the	Definition,	together	read	
back	into	the	text	current	concerns	and	thereby	reduce	the	“richness	and	elusiveness”	of	
the	 Definition,	 albeit	 in	 contrary	 ways	 according	 to	 the	 author’s	 own	 (problematical)	
proclivities.9		
	
From	her	study	of	these	three	options,	Coakley	draws	some	significant	conclusions:	
First,	 the	Definition	 is	 properly	 understood	 as	 a	 “ruling	 out	 of	 disjunctive	 possibilities.”	
Thus,	in	contrast	to	Hick	and	Norris,	Coakley	suggests	that	“a	new,	and	surprising,	reality	
which	we	could	not	previously	have	 thought	possible	 is	being	gestured	 towards”	by	 the	
Definition.10	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 literalists,	 Coakley,	 in	 a	 self‐consciously	Kantian	manner,	
suggests:	“[T]he	Chalcedonian	‘definition’—as	Nicaea	and	Constantinople	before	it—takes	
for	 granted	 the	achievement	of	 salvation	 in	Christ	 and	 then	asks	what	must	be	 the	 case	
																																																													
6	Coakley,	“What	Does	Chalcedon	Solve?,”	150.	
7	One	wishes	Coakley	would	have	further	developed	this	interesting	(dis)connection	regarding	religious	
experience	and	language	and	being.	But	see	Coakley,	“What	does	Chalcedon	solve?”,	151	for	an	interesting	
juxtaposition	of	Norris	with	Ps.‐Denys	and	Thomas	Aquinas.	Coakley	suggest	that	Norris	fails	to	realize	that	
traditional	reflection	itself	already	constructively	performs	the	deconstruction	that	Norris	wants.	Another	
interesting	dimension	to	this	critique	beyond	what	Coakley	offers	here	would	be	to	see	Norris’	pre‐
Lindbeckian,	Heideggerian	roots,	viz.,	that	he	mistakes	univocal	metaphysics	(roughly	from	Suarez	to	Kant)	for	
pre‐modern	analogical	metaphysics	(from	Plato	to	Aquinas).	Augmenting	Coakley	in	this	way	would	be	to	
abstract	Norris	from	his	own	confusions	which	Coakley	does	not	do	and	which	makes	her	critique	of	Norris	
more	heavy‐handed	than	necessary.	In	any	event,	beyond	Coakley,	one	could	also	argue	that	this	traditional	
analogical	metaphysics	is	itself	a	mode	of	articulation	rooted	in	the	Chalcedonian	definition	itself.	Here	the	
analogia	entis,	rightly	conceived,	pace	Norris,	would	be	the	final	flowering	of	Christological	reflection,	which	
becomes	the	very	form	of	theological	thought–e.g.,	as	Balthasar	said,	Christ	is	the	“concrete	analogy	of	being”	
(see	his	A	Theology	of	History,	[San	Francisco:	Ignatius,	1992]	and	Theo‐Drama	III:	Dramatis	Personae:	Persons	
in	Christ,	trans.	Graham	Harrison	[San	Francisco:	Ignatius,	1994]).		
8	Coakley,	“What	does	Chalcedon	solve?”,	153‐9.	
9	It	is	potentially	confusing	that	Coakley	seems	to	rest	her	argument	on	an	apprehension	of	the	original	
intention	of	the	authors	of	the	document	itself,	which	seems	to	me	to	be	not	only	problematical	for	many	
contemporary	readers—and	I	would	have	thought	Coakley	herself.	See	ibid.,	145‐6.	To	say	that	a	
contemporary	theologian	is	eisegetically	informing	her	text	is	one	thing;	to	say	that	one	has	psychological	
insights	into	the	original	intention	of	another	author,	and	to	equate	it	with	one’s	own	reading	of	the	text	in	
contradistinction	to	others,	instead	of	resting	one’s	argument	on	more	solid	ground,	philosophical	and	
historical	development	for	example,	is	another	thing	entirely.	To	be	sure,	Coakley	evades	this	problem	directly	
by	mostly	negative	ascription,	i.e.,	by	exposing	the	eisegesis	of	others.	So	it	is	her	use	of	the	term	“original	
intention”	that	raises	the	question,	though	it	is	still	unclear	how	much	she	positively	equates	her	constructive	
proposal	with	the	original,	positive	intention	of	the	authors,	apart	from	the	history	of	reception	of	the	text	
(Wirkungsgeschichte).		
10	Ibid.,	156.		
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about	that	Christ	if	such	salvation	is	possible.”11	In	other	words,	the	ontological	reality	of	
Christ	 is	 described,	 but	 in	 no	 way	 circumscribed.	 The	 Definition	 is	 neither	 “precise”	
definition,	 nor	 does	 it	 lack	 ontological	 commitments;	 it	 is	 less	metaphorical	 or	 logically	
incoherent,	 than	 it	 is	 a	 “paradox”	 or	 “riddle,”	 an	 invitation	 to	 thought.	 Specifically,	 for	
Coakley,	 it	 defines	 a	 “horizon”	 by	 dismissing	 aberrant	 interpretations,	 it	 offers	 a	 simple	
rule	(the	distinction	between	hypostasis	and	physis)	for	articulating	the	unity	and	duality	
in	Christ,	and,	finally,	most	often	overlooked,	it	recapitulates	in	summary	form	the	salvific	
narrative	 itself.12	There	 are	 therefore	 apophatic	 dimensions	of	 the	Definition,	which	 are	
not	divorced	 from	the	kataphatic:	 It	neither	 “explains	nor	grasps”	 the	reality,	but	 rather	
mysteriously	communicates	it.	 In	short,	 it	 is	a	“regulatory	and	binding	pattern”	meant	to	
guide	worshipful	 understanding	 of	 the	 wonders	 of	 salvation,	 and	 thereby	 “invites”	 and	
even	“releases”	creative	reflection.13	  
(2) The Kenotic Meaning of the Definition 
	
Similarly,	in	her	well‐known	essay	on	kenōsis,	Coakley	fills	in	some	of	the	salient	elements	
of	 the	 constructive	 content	 that	 this	 approach	 to	 Chalcedon	 enables.14	 Here	 Coakley	
analyzes	the	history	of	the	term,	providing	a	learned	summary	of	the	theories	of	biblical,	
patristic,	 early	 protestant,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 twentieth	 century	 British	 kenoticists	 and	
contemporary	 philosophy	 of	 religion.	 Through	 a	 feminist	 analysis	 of	 no	 less	 than	 six	
conflicting	 views	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 term,	 Coakley	 concludes	 that	 an	 empowering	
“vulnerability”	before	God,	 in	 the	mode	of	contemplative	prayer,	creates	 the	capacity	 for	
reception	 of	 divine	 “non‐coercive	 power”	 to	 become	 manifest:	 “[T]rue	 divine	
‘empowerment’	 occurs	 most	 unimpededly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 special	 form	 of	 human	
‘vulnerability.’”15	 She	 offers	 this	 version	 of	 kenōsis	 in	 order	 to	 propose	 a	 “vital	 and	
distinctively	 Christian”	 understanding	 of	 kenōsis	 that	 moves	 beyond	 the	 problematic	
pseudo‐feminist	 ideal	 of	 self‐sufficient	 autonomy	 (tied	 as	 it	 is,	 for	 her,	 to	 late‐modern,	
secular,	 perhaps	 even	 atheist‐humanistic	 visions	 of	 the	 good)	 toward	 the	 horizon	 of	 a	
Christological	feminism.		
	
The	 corresponding	Christology,	 then,	 serves	 as	 a	 “corrective”	 to	 secular	 feminism.	
Coakley	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 typical	 rejection	 of	 kenōsis	 by	 contemporary	 feminist	
authors—still,	as	she	says,	“aping	the	 ‘masculinism’	they	criticize”—only	applies	to	more	
or	less	recent	understandings	of	the	term,	which	conceives	kenōsis	as	an	afflictive	release	
of	 self‐shared	 by	 divinity	 and	 humanity	 in	 salvific	 action.	 Instead,	 Coakley	 elects	 a	
“gentler”	kenoticism,	primarily	understood	as	an	opening	to	the	Other,	that	is	first	rooted	
in	the	kenotic	theory	of	the	Lutheran	Giessen	theologians,	who	make	a	strong	distinction	
between	the	“self‐emptying”	that	 is	human,	and	the	divine	that	retains	but	refrains	 from	
																																																													
11	Ibid.	It	is	perhaps	important	to	observe	that	this	loosely	Kantian	Christological	(transcendental)	deduction	is	
very	close	to	Sergei	Bulgakov	(and	Barth	and	Balthasar	for	that	matter).	Yet	Bulgakov	of	course	extends	the	
meaning	of	the	Christological	deduction	to	God	and	humanity	as	such	by	way	of	his	controversial	concept	of	
Sophia.	The	development	of	the	present	reflections	on	Christological	humanism	(specifically	feminism)	along	
sophiological	lines	will	have	to	be	developed	elsewhere.			
12	Ibid.,	161.		
13	Ibid.,	161‐3.	
14	Sarah	Coakley,	“Kenōsis	and	Subversion:	On	the	Repression	of	‘Vulnerability’	in	Christian	Feminist	Writing”	
Powers	and	Submissions:	Spirituality,	Philosophy	and	Gender	(Oxford:	Blackwells,	2002)	3‐39.	
15	Ibid.,	32.	
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using	 its	 power.	 She	 strongly	 rejects	 the	 alternative	 (Thomasius	 and	 the	 “new	
kenoticists”),	 according	 to	which	 the	divine	Logos	actually	 (and	 freely)	 gives	up	 its	own	
divine	 power	 in	 the	 act	 of	 incarnation.	 This	 second	 view,	 instead	 of	 rearticulating	 the	
meaning	of	divine	power	in	terms	of	liberative	freedom,	instead	“reduces	God’s	‘power’	to	
an	 inherent	 powerlessness.”16	 This	 is	 an	 interesting	 analysis	 but	 the	more	 fundamental	
issue	concerns	whether	the	correlation	between	a	receptive	vulnerability	of	the	creature	
(rooted	 in	 grace)	 to	 an	 empowering	 divine	 and	 a	 Christology	 that	 orients	 itself	 starting	
from	the	difference	of	two	terms	(divine	and	human	“natures”)	does	not	actually	retain	a	
problematic	 sense	 of	 relation	 (implying	 “competition”)	 ‐	 even	 in	 the	 mode	 of	
contemplation	–	and	therefore	also	a	(secular,	modern)	feminist	sense	of	“autonomy”	that	
she	rejects.		
	
This	 last	 observation	 makes	 better	 sense	 when	 one	 realizes	 that	 Coakley,	 in	
accordance	with	her	concern	for	maintaining	an	empowering	divine,	tends	to	see	that	the	
Alexandrian	 identification	of	 the	hypostasis	 of	 Christ	 solely	with	 the	 transcendent	Logos	
necessarily	 harbors	 a	 “lurking	 ‘docetism,’”	which,	 she	 suggests,	 is	 a	 view	 related	 to	 the	
total	 reversal	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 kenōsis	 that	 occurred	 between	 Paul	 (who	 was	 not	
concerned	 with	 articulating	 the	 relation	 between	 divinity	 and	 humanity	 in	 the	 kenotic	
hymn)	 in	the	first	century	and	Chalcedonian	thinkers	 in	the	fifth	(for	whom	the	hymn	is	
primarily	 treated	 as	 a	 theological	 metaphysics).	 With	 this	 view	 she	 agrees	 with	 Karl	
Rahner	 analysis	 of	 the	 “current	 crisis”	 in	 Christology.17	 For	 Rahner,	 the	 “almost	
unavoidable	 consequence”	 of	 a	 deficient	 view	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 full	 humanity	 of	 Jesus	
Christ	 is	 to	 lose	 the	necessity	of	his	humanity	 for	his	role	as	mediator	between	God	and	
humanity.18	An	“Apollinarian”	emphasis	on	person,	as	in	Cyril,	leads	only	to	the	forfeiture	
of	the	“genuine,	spontaneous,	free,	spiritual,	active	centre,	a	human	self‐consciousness”	in	
the	fullest	sense	of	the	word.19	Thus,	“the	doctrine	of	the	two	natures	is	quite	insufficient	
as	a	ground	from	which	to	derive	this	insight	into	Christ’s	mediation	as	something	which	
arises	from	the	inner	tendency	of	the	doctrine.”20	The	danger,	for	Rahner,	as	in	Coakley,	is	
a	one‐sided	emphasis	on	the	hypostatic	union,	 to	 the	denigration	of	 the	 full	humanity	of	
Christ.	 We	 will	 find	 ourselves	 required	 to	 ask	 below	 if	 this	 binary	 view	 that	 sees	 an	
emphasis	on	hypostatic	unity	as	dangerous	for	the	distinction	of	natures,	conceived	in	an	a	
priori	manner,	 is	 the	best	approach	 to	 the	Chalcedonian	dogma,	 and	 if	 it	 is	 in	danger	of	
missing	the	very	genius	of	conciliar	Christianity	tout	court.		In	Cyrilline	reflection	after	the	
Council	(John	of	Damascus),	for	example,	as	a	result	of	the	unity	of	Christ’s	hypostasis,	the	
humanity	of	the	Logos	is	still	reduced	to	a	mere	“instrument”	(as	in	Cyril)	fully	subsumed	
by	 the	 divine	 through	 a	 perichoretic	 saturation	 of	 the	 humanity	 with	 divine	 attributes.	
Divine	 power	 is	 thus	 still,	 according	 to	 Coakley,	 only	 “forceful	 obliteration.”21	 Instead,	
Coakley	 suggests	 that	 Christ’s	 personal	 identity	 should	 be	 comprehended	 as	 an	 event	
constructed	through	(“confected	out	of”)	 the	encounter	of	divine	and	human	realities.	 In	
																																																													
16	Ibid.,	38.	
17	See	the	programmatic	essay,	Karl	Rahner,	“Current	Problems	in	Christology”,	Theological	Investigations,	Vol	
1,	God,	Christ,	Mary	and	Grace,	trans.	Cornelius	Ernst,	O.	P.	(NY:	Crossroad,	1982),	149‐200.	
18	Ibid.,	157.	
19	Ibid.,	158.	
20	Ibid.,	161.	See	also	his	later	essay	“Christology	Today?”	in	Theological	Investigations,	Vol.	3,	The	Theology	of	
the	Spiritual	Life,	trans.	Karl	H.	and	Boniface	Kruger	(London:	Denton,	Longman	and	Todd,	1967),	esp.	30‐1,	for	
a	similar	assessment.	
21	See	Coakely,	“Kenōsis	and	Subversion”,	11‐16.	
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other	 words,	 Coakley	 wants	 to	 read	 Chalcedon	 with	 an	 Antiochene	 stress.22	 Coakley’s	
reading	 of	 Cyrilline	 and	 Alexandrian	 Christology	 is	 arguably	 facile.	 Already	 in	 Cyril	 the	
incarnate	hypostasis	is	understood	in	“complex”	terms	to	be	a	person	at	once	human	and	
divine	 and	 as	 much	 the	 former	 as	 the	 latter.	 This	 hypostatic	 complexity	 lies	 in	 direct	
continuity,	as	our	next	author	will	show,	with	the	Dionysian	account	of	the	theandricity	of	
Christ	 (“theandric	 energies”).	 This	 ought	 to	 mollify	 at	 least	 Coakley’s	 criticism	 that	 the	
Alexandrian	 style	 ignores	or	even	denigrates	 the	 full	 integrity	of	 the	humanity	of	Christ,	
and	 if	 so,	 it	 makes	 the	 ground	 on	 which	 she	 builds	 her	 Christology	 shaky.23	 This	
observation	 leads	 us	 to	 the	 crucial	 question	 which	 we	 will	 have	 to	 ask	 ourselves	
subsequently:	 Is	Coakley’s	 intention	to	preserve	one	aspect	(difference)	at	a	high	cost	 to	
the	 other	 (unity)	 the	 best	 mode	 of	 approach	 to	 fulfil	 the	 very	 theological	 and	
anthropological	concerns	that	motivate	her	theology?	
	
B. According to Riches 
(1) Only Union “Differentiates” 
	
In	 a	 recent	 essay,	 Coakley’s	 younger	 contemporary,	 Aaron	 Riches	 has	 proffered	 an	
alternative	view	to	what	we	see	in	Coakley,	by	which	he	seeks	to	fulfil	many	of	the	same	
concerns	and	constructive	interests.	Here	Riches	follows	Henri	de	Lubac’s	particular	mode	
of	ressourcement	in	contradistinction	to	Rahner’s.24	
	
Taking	the	opposite	tact	than	Coakley,	in	his	Christological	reflection	Riches	begins	
from	union,	a	union	of	two	natures	which	alone	properly	“differentiates.”	He	thus	sees	the	
very	 essence	of	 the	 creaturely	being,	 its	 freedom,	 integrity	 and	 self‐determination—one	
could	even	say	its	flourishing—to	be	located	beyond	it,	 in	God,	and	thus	finding	the	very	
fulfilment	and	integrity	of	its	existence	only	in	its	radical	contingency	vis‐à‐vis	the	divine.	
The	key	phrase	occurs	at	the	beginning	of	his	essay:	“union	is	established	in	differentiated	
communion.”	Now,	in	order	to	understand	this,	it	is	first	crucial	to	see	that,	for	de	Lubac,	
the	 general	 conception	 of	 the	 relation	 of	 the	 natural	 and	 supernatural	 spheres	 follows	
from	 the	 concrete	 form	 of	 revelation,	 particularly	 and	 definitively	 in	 Jesus	 Christ.25	
																																																													
22	Textually,	she	bases	this	reading	on	the	following:	The	Definition	only	uses	the	word	hypostasis	after	the	
phrase	concerned	with	the	“concurrence”	of	the	two	natures—which	means	for	her,	it	seems,	that	the	natures	
are	first	considered	as	two	disparate,	complete	totalities	before	their	union	in	the	person	of	the	Logos.	See	
ibid.,	fn.	81,	38.		
23	Supplementing	this	perspective,	we	can	note	that	for	the	same	Alexandrian	Christological	tradition(s)	the	
notion	of	communicatio	idiomatum,	understood	within	the	context	of	the	“theandricity”	of	Christ’s	hypostasis,	
was	already	seen	to	possess	a	reciprocity	within	the	exchange:	in	the	incarnation	human	and	divine	natures	
received	properties	of	the	other,	though	in	ways	appropriate	to	the	integrity	of	each	nature	(the	divine,	for	
example,	comes	to	“suffer”	albeit,	“unsufferingly.”	See	the	important	study,	John	McGuckin,	St	Cyril	of	
Alexandria:	The	Christological	Controversy:	Its	History,	Theology	and	Texts	(Crestwood,	NY:	St.	Vladimir	
Seminary	Press,	2004),	184‐93.	See	also	The	Theology	of	St.	Cyril	of	Alexandria:	A	Critical	Appreciation,	ed.	
Thomas	Weinandy	and	Daniel	Keating	(Edinburgh:	T&T	Clark,	2003).	I	would	like	to	acknowledge	the	
anonymous	reviewer	of	this	essay	who	brought	this	critical	point	to	my	attention.		
24	That	is,	Christological	as	distinct	from	“philosophical”	(as	in	Rahner’s	“theological‐anthropology”).	Aaron	
Riches,	“After	Chalcedon:	The	Oneness	of	Christ	and	the	Dyothelite	Mediation	of	his	Theandric	Unity”	Modern	
Theology	24	(2008),	199‐224.	Riches	develops	his	Christological	reflections	further	in	Christ:	The	End	of	
Humanism	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Eerdmans,	forthcoming).	See	Adrian	Pabst’s	similar	perspective	from	his	brief	
remarks	in	Metaphysics:	The	Creation	of	Hierarchy	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Eerdmans,	2012)	65.	Thanks	to	the	
anonymous	reviewer	for	pointing	out	this	felicitous	connection.	
25	See	Henri	de	Lubac,	The	Discovery	of	God,	trans.	Alexander	Dru	(Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Eerdmans,	1996),	220.	
AEJT	20.1	(April	2013)	 	 Hackett	/	A	Fragment	of	Christology	
	 8	
Christology	lies	behind	his	thesis	regarding	the	“supernatural”	ground	of	the	natural.	The	
same	 should	 be	 said	 of	 Riches	 here.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 in	 contrast	 to	 Riches,	 the	
opposite	 movement	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 concrete	 and	 general	 is	 embraced	 by	
Coakley:	 theology	 is	 informed	 first	 by	 particular	 anthropological	 assumptions	
(undergirded	 by	 an	 “extrinsic”	 account	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 God	 and	 creature)	
imported	 into	 Christological	 reflection.	 Their	 primary,	 shared	 anthropological	 concern	
(the	 integrity	 of	 the	 creature)	 nevertheless	 fundamentally	 orients	 their	 thought	 in	
opposite	directions.		
	
Interestingly,	Riches,	 in	agreement	with	Coakley,	 suggests	 that	 if	 the	Chalcedonian	
Definition	 is	understood	“discretely,”	 i.e.,	apart	 from	the	salvific	narrative	and	especially	
apart	from	the	dogmatic	developments	in	Christology	of	the	latter	Councils,	it	is	prone	to	
misinterpretation.	The	difference	is	that	Riches	sees	the	problem	of	such	“discreteness”	in	
a	 certain	 Antiochene	 tendency	 inherent	 in	 the	 Definition	 itself:	 The	 “dyophysitism	 (two	
natures)	of	Chalcedon	actually	risks	a	certain	parallelism	of	the	natures	of	Christ,	 insofar	
as	 it	 leaves	 the	communicatio	 idiomatum	 in	 the	One	Christ	 unspecified.	Thus,	 as	 long	 as	
dogmatic	 Christology	 limits	 itself	 to	 Chalcedon,	 going	 only	 so	 far	 as	 the	 4th	 ecumenical	
council,	 it	 remains	 vulnerable	 to	 a	 misconstrual	 of	 Christology	 (and	 therefore	 catholic	
theology	tout	court)	in	a	quasi‐Nestorian	direction.”26	Constructively,	then,	Riches	argues	
that	the	proper,	Alexandrian	conception	of	unity	is	only	“decisively	articulated”	by	the	6th	
Ecumenical	 Council’s	 (Constantinople	 III,	 680‐1)	 appropriation	 of	 Maximus	 the	
Confessor’s	 dyothelitism.	 This	 Council	 develops	 Chalcedon	 by	 bring	 its	 “paradox”	 into	
fuller	view.	That	 is:	 “it	makes	 concrete	 the	communicatio	 idiomatum	 of	difference	 in	 the	
Son’s	 theandric	 unity.”27	 Hence,	 essential	 to	 Riches’	 theology	 is	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	
“paradoxical”	(in	the	Lubacian	humanist	sense)	quality	of	the	Chalcedonian	definition,	as	
well	 as	 the	 integrity	 of	 its	 development	 up	 to	 Constantinople	 III.28	 It	 will	 be	 especially	
important	for	us	to	see	whether	Riches’	“Maximian”	Alexandrianism	can	adequately	speak	
to	Coakley	(and	Karl	Rahner’s)	specific	concern	with	the	integrity	and	freedom	of	human	
nature.		
	
For	 Riches,	 following	 Marie‐Joseph	 le	 Guillou,	 Constantinople	 III	 itself	 can	 only	
properly	be	understood	by	reading	it	through	the	lens	of	the	specific	texts	of	Maximus	(on	
the	 agony	 at	 Gethsemane)	 for	 there	 it	 yields	 a	 “full	 ‘narrativization’”	 of	 the	 ontology	 of	
Christ	 expressed	 in	 the	 Conciliar	 Definitions.29	 Riches	 suggests	 the	 import	 of	 this	
integration	 of	 contextual	 theology	 (Maximus)	 for	 understanding	 the	 Definition:	
“Constantinople	III	affords	a	dogmatic	mode	of	Christology	that	is	at	the	same	time	both	a	
semiotic	 reading	 of	 narrated	 events‐as‐signs	 and	 a	 labour	 of	 speculative	 metaphysics.”	
This	unity	of	symbols	and	narrative	 from	the	biblical	 texts	with	constructive	 intellectual	
																																																													
26	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon,”	200.	
27	Ibid.	
28	Rahner,	on	the	other	hand,	emphatically	asserts	that	Christology	developed	merely	“from	the	New	
Testament	writings	(especially	Paul	and	John)	down	to	the	statements	of	the	Council	of	Chalcedon”		See	
“Christology	Today?”,	25.	
29	Marie‐Joseph	le	Guillou	O.P.	“Quelques	Réflexions	sur	Constantinople	III	et	la	Sotériologie	de	Maxime”,	in	
Maximos	Confessor:	Acts	du	Symposium	sur	Maxime	le	Confesseur	Fribourg,	2‐5	Septembre	1980,	ed.	Felix	
Heinzer	and	Christoph	Schönborn	(Fribourg:	Éditions	Universitaires,	1982)	.	
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venture	is	ultimately	a	part	of	the	Hebraic‐Hellenistic	“narratological”	ontology	distinctive	
to	Christianity.30		
	
Undergirding	Riches’	reflections	 is	a	key	sentence	 in	The	 International	Theological	
Commission’s	 (1979)	 summary	 of	 dyotheletic	 dogma:	 “the	 Church	 declares	 that	 our	
salvation	had	been	willed	by	a	divine	person	through	a	human	will.”31	According	to	Riches,	
this	 statement	 expresses	 the	 crucial	 Christological	 ontology	 intended	 by	 the	
Constantinopalitan	dyothelitism,	viz.,	 that	 the	humanity	of	Christ	 is	God’s	own	humanity.	
For	him	any	account	of	the	implications	of	Christology	for	a	“humanism”	(more	broadly)	
or	 a	 “feminism”	 (more	 particularly)	 must	 seek	 to	 think	 from	 within	 this	 paradoxical	
horizon.	For	Riches	this	is	precisely	what	is	given	by	the	Lubacian	paradox	of	grace,	which	
successfully	upholds	the	priority	of	the	divinity—expressed	in	the	unity	of	the	hypostasis,	
and	 simultaneously,	 the	 upraising	 of	 human	 agency	 in	 salvation—expressed	 in	 the	
diversity	of	natures,	which	is,	crucially,	the	direct	result	of	the	unity	for	human	nature.	So,	
in	 other	 words,	 the	 permanent	 distinction	 of	 the	 natures	 in	 the	 Definition	 is	 meant	 to	
express	 none	 other	 than	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 radical	 unity	 for	 humanity:	 the	 fullness	 of	
humanity	is	realized	in	personal	union	with	the	Logos.	Reflecting	on	Maximus,	Riches	says:	
“In	a	Cyrilline	sense,	Jesus—because	he	is	the	incarnate	Logos—is	the	True	Man,	but	he	is	
never	 a	 ‘pure	man’”	Thus,	 “Christ’s	 humanity	 subsists	divinely	 in	 the	Person	of	 the	 Son.	
Therefore	 everything	 Jesus	 is	 and	 everything	 Jesus	 wills,	 both	 ‘is’	 and	 is	 ‘willed’	 in	 the	
unity	of	the	divine	Person.”32	One	must	say	here	that	dyothelitism	is	misunderstood	if	the	
humanity	 of	 Jesus	 is	 figured	 in	 distinction	 from	 its	 enhypostatic	 actualization.	 An	
anhypostatic	human	nature	–	like	the	Thomist	notion	of	“pure	nature”	–	can	only	ever	be	
an	abstraction.	There	is,	in	other	words,	no	conceivable	human	nature	of	Christ	apart	from	
its	union	with	divine	nature	 in	 the	hypostasis	of	 the	Logos.	Again,	 for	 this	Christological‐
humanist	vision,	it	is	the	unity	itself	that	differentiates.		
	
For	 Riches,	 the	 maxim	 of	 dogmatic	 Christology	 is:	 the	 greater,	 more	 intensely	
expressed	 is	 the	 unity	 with	 the	 divine,	 the	 greater,	 more	 intensely	 expressed	 (and	
therefore	 more	 adequately	 understood)	 is	 the	 humanity	 as	 such.	 Thus	 it	 is	 that	 in	
Gethsemane,	in	the	filial	prayer	of	the	Son	to	the	Father,	that	we	first	learn	the	theological	
truth	 that	 “unity	 differentiates”.	 Here	 there	 is	 no	 opposition	 between	 the	 divinity	 and	
humanity	 of	 Jesus,	 but	 rather	 an	 essential	 relation,	 organically	 and	 hierarchically	
understood,	in	which	the	humanity	arrives	to	itself	only	as	it	abandons	itself	in	obedience	
to	 the	 divine.	 Thus,	 for	 this	 vision,	 it	 is	 the	 divinity	 of	 Christ	 that	 is	 the	 essential	
precondition,	 not	 only	 for	 his	 perfect	 unity	 with	 humanity,	 but	 also	 for	 the	 greatest	
realization	of	humanity	as	such.	Otherwise	said,	in	Christ,	humanity	is	a	gift	to	itself;	this	is	
its	 greatest	 freedom.	 “[T]here	 is	 only	 authentic	 humanity	where	 there	 is	 theosis.”33	 The	
complete	preservation	of	the	distinction	between	the	divine	and	human	natures	of	Christ	
																																																													
30	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon,”	204,	referring	also	to	John	Milbank,	Theology	and	Social	Theory:	Beyond	Secular	
Reason	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2nd	edition,	2006):	“Narrative	and	ontology	reinforce	each	other	in	an	ontology	of	
difference,	because	God	must	be	known	both	as	the	‘speaking’	of	created	difference,	and	as	an	inexhaustible	
plenitude	of	otherness”	(48).	
31	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon,”	203.	See	“Select	Question	on	Christology”	in	International	Theological	Commission:	
Texts	and	Documents	1969‐1985,	ed.	Michael	Sharkey,	(San	Francisco:	Ignatius,	1989),	192.	See	also	the	first	
section	of	”After	Chalcedon”	(“Crisis	in	Christology”),	which	thoroughly	provides	all	the	details	concerning	the	
aims	and	scope	of	this	Commission	(201‐3).	
32	Ibid.,	204.	
33	Ibid.,	202.	
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is	not	a	dualism,	but	is	rather	more	paradoxical,	“a	differentiated	unity,”	 in	which	–	as	in	
the	 genuine,	 Thomist	 notion	 of	 analogy	 –	 the	 increase	 of	 the	 union	 only	 realises	 the	
difference	all	the	more.	The	upshot	is	the	paradox	that	the	more	one	seeks	a	humanity	in	
integral	distinction	from	the	divine,	the	more	one	has	to	emphasize	the	union	in	order	to	
obtain	it	 in	the	most	radical	manner	possible.	According	to	this	vision	we	would	have	to	
conclude	that	because	the	creature’s	true	end	is	in	communion	with	God	(this	being	what	
the	 divine‐humanity	 of	 Christ	 reveals),	 so	 the	 creature	 becomes	 more	 completely	 non‐
divine	 in	the	realization	of	 this	end	(that	 is,	 in	divinization	 itself).	Thus	since	there	 is	no	
greater	 unity	 than	 in	 the	 one	 hypostasis	 of	 the	 Son,	 there	 is	 also	 therefore	 no	 greater	
preservation	of	difference;	 it	 is	 the	 condition	of	 true	difference,	 complete	even	as	 it	 is	 a	
dynamic	communicatio.		
	
(2) The Human Will of God 
	
Like	 Coakley,	 Riches	 finally	 articulates	 his	 ontology	 of	 Christ	 in	 light	 of	 a	 theology	 of	
prayer.	Though	the	general	starting	point	is	the	same,	i.e.,	an	integration	of	spirituality	and	
dogmatic	 theology,	 Riches’	 notion	 of	 prayer	 is	 fundamentally	 different.	 All	 Christian	
prayer,	 for	 him,	 is	 specified	 as	 “filial	 prayer,”	 which	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 light	 of	 the	
Balthasarian	 motif	 of	 the	 missio	 of	 the	 Son.	 This	 missio	 is	 Christ’s	 “communicative	
constitution”	in	which	we	come	to	participate	via	the	grace	of	adoption.	What	we	may	call	
Riches’	 “kneeling	 Christology”	 is	 therefore	 rooted	 in	 a	 fundamental	 sense	 of	 vocation	
determined	by	obedience	to	God’s	fatherly	commission.34	This	concrete‐spiritual	starting	
point	 is	 fitting,	 for	 Riches,	 since	 Maximus’	 dyothelitism	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	
Christ’s	 turmoil	 in	 prayer	 in	 Gethsemane	 the	 evening	 of	 his	 arrest.	 Riches	 also	
demonstrates	 the	 richness	 of	 a	 Cyrilline‐Maximian	 stress	 for	 Pneumatology	 and	
Trinitarian	 theology	 more	 generally	 vis‐à‐vis	 this	 narrative.	 He	 finds	 a	 “pneumatology	
underpinning	 dyothelitism”	 in	 the	 mediation	 of	 the	 Son’s	 relation	 to	 the	 Father,	 which	
occurs	by	the	Sprit,	and	therefore	a	true	union	of	desire	in	the	two	wills	of	Christ.	Finally	
Riches	sees	this	mode	of	relation’s	continuation,	again	only	pneumatologically	possible,	in	
the	life	of	those	conformed	to	Christ.	He	concludes:	“The	Church	is	the	living	continuation	
of	Christ’s	divine	personhood.”35	Here	the	Spirit	would	be	articulated	as	the	desire	that	is	
at	 once	differentiating	 and	unifying,	 the	 bond	of	 love	 that	 imparts	 radical	 freedom	only	
within	 the	 deepest	 communion	 –	 an	 echo	 of	 Trinitarian	 theology	 at	 the	 heart	 of	
ecclesiology	Christologically	“concentrated.”	Thus	the	Spirit	who	cries	out	within	us	“Abba,	
Father!”	(Rom.	8:15)	is	also	the	very	same	Spirit	of	Christ,	the	complete	expression	of	love	
that	 is	not	 content	within	 itself	 but	overflows,	 opening	 from	within	 toward	 the	other	 in	
love.	 The	 Church	 is	 the	 human	 community	 caught	 up	 into	 this	 eternal	perichoresis.	 One	
sees	here	how	the	personalist	Christological	concentration	opens	up	seamlessly	onto	the	
social	dimension.	
	
The	profound	(re‐)integration	of	 spirituality	and	Christology	evinced	here	actually	
owes	much	to	Coakley’s	prior	interpretation	of	the	Chalcedonian	Definition	as	a	“horizon,”	
which,	as	we	saw	above,	understood	the	Definition	as	an	opening	of	a	new	possibility	for	
																																																													
34	Compare	Coakley,	“Kenōsis	and	Subversion”,	32‐6	and	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon”	214‐17.	Thanks	to	Dr.	
Riches	for	clarifying	this	point.		
35	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon,”	217.	
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the	articulation	of	the	divine‐human	relationship.36	Riches	generously	develops	Coakley’s	
insights	 for	his	own	 “phenomenological”	 approach,	which	he	uses	 to	overcome	 the	non‐
reductive	parallelism	that	we	have	seen	to	be	integral	to	Coakley’s	approach	to	Chalcedon.	
Taking	an	undeveloped	reference	by	Coakley	to	Gregory	Nazianzen’s	statement	that	Christ	
himself	 is	 literally	 the	 horizon	 of	 God	 for	 us,	 Riches	 says:37	 “[F]or	 us	 Jesus	 is	 only	
manifested	 in	 the	 existential	 act	 of	 our	 own	 following	 into	 that	 communication	 itself	…	
Only	by	tracing	the	Son’s	personal	communication	do	we	apprehend	who	he	is.”38	We	see	
here	that	Riches	follows	Coakley	in	the	spiritual	reading	of	the	Definition,	but	he	develops	
it	 in	 the	 complete	 opposite	 direction,	 since,	 for	 Coakley,	 the	 horizon	 should	 first	 be	
understood	as	the	articulation	of	a	difference	that	guards	both	the	transcendence	of	God	
and	 the	 self‐determination	 of	 the	 human.	 In	 short,	 Riches	 pushes	 Coakley’s	 spiritual	
reading	of	the	“horizon”	itself	to	the	point	of	a	concrete	encounter	with	Christ.	For	him	the	
Definition	records,	articulates	and	even	mediates	the	salvific	event.	Riches	thus	concludes:	
“In	 this	 way	 the	 Terminus	 of	 Constantinople	 III	 partakes	 of	 the	 horos	 [‘horizon’]	 of	
Chalcedon,	 placing	 it	 now	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 action	 of	 the	 ‘united	 double	 desire’	 of	
theandric	 communication	 …	 Constantinopolitan	 Christology	 completes	 Coakley’s	
Chalcedonian	 Christology:	 the	 horos	 [‘horizon’]	 opens	 through	 the	 Terminus	 into	 the	
Sequela	Christi.”39	It	must	be	concluded,	though,	that	this	“completion”	of	Coakley	is	also	a	
fundamental	redirection,	seeking	to	achieve	what	Coakley	desires	but	by	another	way.		
	
Finally,	Riches	suggests	that	clarification	of	the	communicatio	idiomatum	vis‐à‐vis	a	
proper	 (Cyrilline)	 dyothelitism	 is	 enough	 to	 specify	 the	 “ontological	 mode	 of	 the	
circumincession	 of	 difference	 in	 Christ.”40	 Summarizing	 Maximus	 (Opusculum	 7),	 he	
articulates	 the	 communicatio	 in	 this	way:	 “In	 Jesus,	 the	 human	 by	 nature	works	 to	will	
divinely	 what	 God	 by	 nature	 works	 to	 will	 humanly.”41	 Interestingly,	 Riches	 notes	 a	
correspondence	in	Maximus	here	with	both	Cyril	of	Alexandria	and	the	“non‐Chalcedonian	
Syriac	Christology”	of	Pseudo‐Denys	 the	Areopagite,	 for	whom,	most	 importantly,	Christ	
evinces	 a	 “new	 theandric	 energy.”42	 This	 notion	 of	 “theandric”	 energy	 is	 all‐important.	
Significantly,	Riches	articulates	its	meaning	for	us	through	Maximus,	from	Ambiguum	48,	
who	enigmatically	states:		
God,	 having	 made	 all	 nature	 according	 to	 wisdom,	 secretly	 placed	 in	 each	 being	 of	
rational	nature	a	primary	dunamis	of	knowledge	of	him	…	 for	 in	giving	 to	us	humble	
humans—according	 to	 our	 nature—this	 yearning	 and	 eros	 for	 him,	 God	 himself	
naturally	partakes	in	the	dunamis	of	the	principle	of	our	being43		
	
																																																													
36	I	should	also	mention	Ratzinger	here	as	a	fundamental	influence	as	well.	Thus	it	is	tempting	to	suggest	that	
Riches’	theology	of	prayer	is	of	the	Communio	school,	whereas	Coakley’s,	by	comparison,	would	tend	more	to	
the	Concilium	school.		
37	See	Coakley,	What	Does	Chalcedon	Solve?,	160;	Gregory	Nazianzen,	Theological	Orations,	38.	18.		
38	Riches,	After	Chalcedon,	211.	Compare	Balthasar’s	basic	thesis	in	the	first	volume	of	his	magnum	opus,	for	
whom	faith	is	a	movement	of	the	whole	person	into	God	which	is	only	then	true	spiritual	knowledge	(The	Glory	
of	the	Lord	Vol.	I:	Seeing	the	Form,	2nd	ed.,	trans.	John	Riches	et	al.	[San	Francisco:	Ignatius,	2009]).		
39	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon,”	212.	
40	Ibid.,	207.	
41	Ibid.,	209.	
42	See	ibid.	and	Cyril	of	Alexandria,	In	Joannis	Evangelium,	11.2.33	(PG	74.473	D),	and	Pseudo‐Denys,	Epistola	4	
(PG	3.1072B‐C),	for	relevant	texts.	
43	See	Riches,	“After	Chalcedon,”	212.	Emphases	mine.		
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With	this	statement	we	reach	the	most	sacred	interior	of	Alexandrian	dyothelitism,	
which	attempts	 to	express	even	 further	 the	radicality	of	 the	paradox	of	 the	union	of	 the	
two	 natures.	 According	 to	Maximus,	 God	 imparted	 Godself	 at	 the	 very	 center	 of	 human	
being	in	the	act	of	creation	in	order	for	human	beings	to	be	fundamentally	ordered	toward	
God	 as	 their	 natural	 end.	 God	 is	 therefore	 the	 very	 presupposition	 for	 the	meaning	 of	
human	nature:	 the	 total	measure	 of	 humanity	 is	 (by	 grace)	 divinity	 itself,	which	Riches	
concretely	expresses	as	“the	theandric	reciprocity	of	created	and	uncreated	Love.”44	There	
is	therefore	the	very	same	desire	that	defines	both	divine	and	human	natures—desiderium	
naturale	videndem	Deum—but	existing	according	 to	 two	different	modes,	 a	divine	and	a	
creaturely.	 In	Christ,	 then,	 the	 radical	 unity	 is	 completed	 and	made	 explicit	 through	 the	
communicatio	 idiomatum	 in	 Christ’s	 concrete	 acts	 of	 love	 for	 the	 Father:	 viz.,	 the	 total	
conformation	of	his	will	to	the	Father’s	in	his	obedience	all	the	way	from	manger	through	
the	Garden	to	 the	Cross.	 In	 the	complete	conformity	of	his	human	will	 to	his	divine	will,	
enacted	through	his	limitless,	divine	desire	to	please	the	Father,	the	Son	carries	humanity	
with	him	through	the	“wages	of	sin”,	overcoming	humanity’s	death	by	the	inexhaustibility	
of	his	divine	love.	He	therefore	liberates	human	nature,	providing	it	the	capacity	to	realize	
its	 true	end,	 implanted	within	 it	 from	the	beginning.	The	“energy”	(dunamis)	of	Christ	 is	
both	divine	and	human,	truly	divine	and	truly	human—theandric—completely	divine	and	
therefore	 completely	human.	Hence,	 for	Riches,	 “[t]here	 is	no	 ‘pure’	 life	of	 Jesus	 that	can	
discretely	serve	the	normative	function	of	an	‘original	text’,	there	is	no	‘humanity’	of	Jesus	
that	 can	 be	 manifested	 apart	 from	 his	 divine	 Person,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 ‘pure	 nature’	 of	
humanity	 that	 can	 be	 revealed	 apart	 from	 the	 theandric	 Christ	 who	 ‘reveals	 man	 to	
himself’.”45		
	
Thus,	according	to	Riches,	 the	Chalcedonian	Definition	teaches	us	 that	 in	salvation	
there	is	a	synergism	(two	wills	from	two	natures)	rooted	within	and	made	possible	by	the	
a	priori	monergism	(and	thus	one	divine	Person)	of	God:	The	salvation	wrought	by	grace	is	
truly	a	human	work,	but	only	insofar	as	it	is	utterly	and	definitively	rooted	in	God’s	prior	
action.			
	
C. BETWEEN RICHES AND COAKLEY  
The Problem of A “Pure Nature”  
	
Following	 Riches’	 construction,	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	 read	 in	 Coakley	 an	 unwitting	
accommodation	 with	 an	 all‐too‐neo‐Scholastic	 “parallelism,”	 which	 only	 serves	 to	 reify	
again	the	separation	of	nature	and	grace	into	two	discrete	spheres.	It	is	often	said	that	for	
Karl	 Rahner	 the	 old	 duplex	 ordo	 is	 dissolved	 but	 re‐inscribed	 by	 a	more	 self‐subsisting	
philosophical	 anthropology	 that	 only	 serves	 to	 naturalize	 grace	 in	 the	 end.	 If	 this	 is	 the	
case,	 it	 substantially	 informs	 his	 Christology.	 This	 is,	 of	 course,	 a	 bit	 of	 a	 caricature:	
Rahner’s	 supernatural	 existential	 is	much	more	 subtle	 and	 complex,	 owing	more	 to	 the	
logic	of	Christology—filtered	through	Thomistic	metaphysics	in	its	encounter	with	Kant—
than	is	typically	understood.	Yet	there	is	no	doubt	that	his	theology	fundamentally	bears	
an	anthropological	starting	point.46	Because	of	this	the	role	of	Christology	in	particular	is	
																																																													
44	Ibid.,	213.	
45	Ibid.,	217.	
46	See	Rahner,	“Current	Problems,”	166.		
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unclear	in	the	articulation	of	his	theological	anthropology.	Nevertheless,	even	if	Rahner’s	
Kantian‐Heideggerian	(perplexing	in	itself!)	terminology	bears	much	of	the	blame	for	this	
critique,	 and	 therefore	 recognition	 of	 this	 no	 doubt	 blunts	 the	 edges	 of	 the	 harshest	
elements	 of	 the	 criticism,	 Rahner’s	 anthropological	 construction,	 apart	 from	 the	
terminology,	arrives	from	somewhere	else	than	concrete	revelation.	At	the	very	least	it	is	
articulated	by	a	philosophical	grammar	which	is	less	than	thoroughly	probed	and	purified	
by	 the	 light	 of	 the	 data	 of	 revelation.	 So,	 Rahner’s	 conception	 of	 “nature”,	 if	 it	 is	 surely	
(always,	already!)	uplifted,	perfected,	healed	by	grace,	it	is	nevertheless	less	clear	how	this	
transformation	 relates	 to	 the	 apocalyptic	 drama	 of	 salvation	 in	 history.	 Is	 the	 latter	 an	
addendum	to	the	former	anthropological	structure	which	really	does	all	the	soteriological	
work?	For	Coakley,	one	could	say,	this	“parallelism”	is	subtler,	resulting	perhaps	from	the	
particular	weight	of	her	feminist	commitments,	which,	if	Riches	is	right	about	the	unitive	
origin	of	human	difference	and	integrity,	are	less	than	fully	integrated	in	her	constructive	
thought.	If	this	is	the	case	then	it	would	raise	the	question	whether	the	final	good	of	female	
liberation	on	her	account	still	(at	least	latently)	demands	a	view	of	the	human	creature	as	
autonomous,	independent	and	complete	in	itself,	bearing	within	a	self‐realizable	end	that	
brings	 into	 question	 the	 need	 for	 a	 supernatural	 end	 that	 orders	 the	 totality	 of	 the	
creature—and	 this	 despite	 her	 critical	 theological	 rearticulation	 designed	 to	 refigure	
feminist	 teleology	with	 this	 particular	 problem	 in	mind.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 problem	 is	
that	the	articulation	of	the	good	of	 liberation	is	harshly	(if	 implicitly)	distinguished	from	
the	 final	 eschatological	 good	 of	 the	 visio	beatifica.	 This	we	would	 have	 to	 trace	 back	 to	
what	we	can	call	at	least	by	comparison	to	Riches,	her	bifurcated	Christology.	To	elect	the	
former	 (liberation)	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 latter	 (eschatology)	 is	 merely	 to	 reverse	 the	
binary	 of	 neo‐scholastic	 “two	 orders	 theology”	 and	 therefore	 to	 remain	 shackled	 to	 its	
logic.	In	terms	of	Christology	this	inevitably	tends	towards	a	stress	on	the	distinction	and	
self‐integrity	of	 the	human	nature	conceived	 in	some	way	apart	 from	 its	union	 from	the	
divine,	 which	would	 seem,	 therefore,	 to	 remain	 a	 problem	 for	 feminist	 Christologies	 in	
general.	However,	despite	this	neo‐scholastic	remainder	of	a	“pure	nature”	in	her	thought,	
the	promise	of	Coakley’s	feminism	lies	precisely	here:	she	may	liberate	feminism	from	its	
debilitating	reliance	on	that	which	it	seeks	to	deconstruct,	i.e.,	its	discourse	framed,	in	an	
inverse	and	negative	manner,	by	traditional	patriarchal	modes	of	thought.	
	
Rahner,	 despite	 rightly	 rejecting	 the	 received	 view	 that	 the	 gratuity	 of	 grace	 is	
properly	maintained	 via	 a	 nature	 understood	 as	 possessing	 no	 intrinsic	 need	 for	 grace,	
still	 allows	 a	 highly	 developed	 anthropocentric	 starting	 point	 to	 shape	 the	 theological	
dimension.	For	Coakley	though,	the	relation	is	again	more	complex:	the	problem	is	figured	
with	 feminist	 liberative	 ends	 in	mind,	 in	which	 the	 Cyrilline	 unification	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
theological	 coherence	 results	 in	 “strained	 credibility	 about	 the	 form	 of	 Christ’s	 earthly	
life.”47	 Such	 a	 reading	 of	 the	 Cyrilline	 emphasis	 on	 the	 priority	 of	 the	 divine,	 that	 is,	
understood	 to	 be	 asserted	 over	 against	 the	 human	 may	 “insidiously	 fuel	 masculinist	
purposes”	 indeed,	 but	 only	 for	 conceptions	 of	 the	 divine	 tied	 to	 anthropomorphist	
perversions.48	Yet,	in	light	of	Riches,	one	wonders	whether	this	is	the	best	reading	of	the	
Christologies	of	henosis	 [union]:	To	consider	 the	creature	as	essentially	dependent	upon	
the	creator	for	its	very	own	creaturehood,	the	end	of	which	is	beyond	it	in	God’s	life—is	it	
advisable	 or	 necessary	 to	 abandon	 this	 conception	 for	 some	 sort	 of	 “pure	 nature”?	
Perhaps,	given	Riches’	indications,	the	best	approach	is	to	consider	this	Cyrilline	emphasis	
																																																													
47	Coakley,	“Kenosis	and	Subversion”,	14.		
48	Ibid.,	15.	
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as	the	best	Christology	for	a	truly	liberative	program	for	humanity	in	general	and	woman	
in	particular:	henosis	and	kenosis	are,	in	Christ,	mutually	complementary	perspectives.		
	
One	wonders	also,	finally,	why	Coakley’s	particular	reading,	so	bent	on	stressing	the	
human	freedom	of	Christ	over‐against	the	divine,	attempts	to	make	a	theological	decision	
which	 the	Definition	 itself	 attempts	 to	 rule	 out.	 If	 read	 in	 this	way,	 her	 proposal	would	
seem	 to	 subsume	or	 at	 least	 imply,	 one	 the	 one	hand,	 a	 bizarre	Eutychianism,	 in	which	
Christ	 becomes	 a	 “third	 thing”,	 an	 amalgamation	 of	 divinity	 and	 humanity—only	 here,	
strangely,	in	terms	of	person	instead	of	nature,	and	thus,	on	the	other	hand,	a	human	fully	
integral	 in	 itself	prior	 to	 the	union,	all	 too	redolent	of	 the	 “prosopic”	union	of	Nestorius.	
Coakley’s	concern	seems	to	be	that	the	union	itself	not	be	imposed	from	beyond	by	divine	
“fiat”	 before	 the	 agency	 of	 Christ’s	 humanity.	 At	 this	 point	 one	 would	 wonder	 then,	
whether	Coakley	would	still	accept	the	orthodox	title	Theotokos	for	the	Virgin?	(Finally,	at	
this	point,	 the	horizon	of	a	Mariology	would	seem	to	become	essential	here	 for	 feminist	
concerns.)	Taken	at	face	value,	it	seems	her	Christology	would	delimit	the	incarnation	to	
Christ’s	 adult	 life—perhaps	 at	 the	 Baptism?	 But	 wouldn’t	 this	 be	 yet	 another	 insidious	
form	of	Adoptionism?	Otherwise,	for	her,	human	freedom	and	nature	is	put	in	jeopardy	by	
a	 divine	 power	 that	 overwhelms	 creaturely	 reality,	 rather	 than	 realizing	 its	 inherent	
possibilities.	Coakley	does	not	say	whether	she	accepts	Maximus	the	Confessor’s	view	that	
human	 nature	 as	 such	 performs	 a	 certain	 (active)	 receptivity	 to	 the	 divine.	 This	would	
alleviate	many	of	these	difficulties	that	I	draw	out	here,	though,	again,	it	would	demand	an	
Alexandrian	 rather	 than	Antiochene	 emphasis,	 since,	 for	Maximus,	 the	 humanity	 is	 only	
really	 human	 in	 self‐abandoning	 surrender	 to	 the	 divine,	 a	 kenōsis	 rooted	 in	 the	
Trinitarian	life,	as	Christ	showed	by	his	agony	in	the	garden.49		
	
If	 what	 we	 outline	 here	 has	 any	 merit,	 then	 Coakley	 disengages	 the	 spiritual	
meaning	of	kenōsis	from	its	concrete	foundations	in	its	originating	Christological	meaning.	
For	her,	 the	 kenotic	hymn	of	Philippians	2	 is	 therefore	primarily	 “an	 invitation	 to	 enter	
into	 Christ’s	 extended	 life	 in	 the	 church,	 not	 just	 to	 speculate	 dispassionately	 on	 his	
nature.”50	 Clearly,	 this	 particular	 disengagement	 is	 undertaken	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 a	 re‐
engagement	of	Christology	and	spiritual	praxis—but	a	Christology	cleansed	of	its	alleged	
tendency	 to	elide	 the	 integrity	and	 freedom	of	 the	human	dimension	 for	 the	sake	of	 the	
hypostatic	 union,	 that	 corresponds,	 she	 insinuates,	 with	 a	 harmful	 spirituality	 of	 self‐
abnegation,	 deferral	 and	 self‐diminishment.	 This	 view	 corresponds	 with	 what	 we	 have	
already	seen	regarding	her	important	insight	into	the	Chalcedonian	formula	as	a	summary	
of	 the	 salvific	 acta,	 rather	 than	 an	 abstract	 metaphysical	 schema.	 In	 so	 doing,	 she	 still	
succeeds	in	making	the	cross	and	resurrection	central	to	her	religious	refigurement	of	the	
liberation	 ideal.	Coakley	offers	much	 to	ponder:	 the	reintegration	of	spiritual	experience	
(prayer)	and	praxis	(feminist	liberation)	with	constructive	dogmatic	reflection	is	clearly	a	
recovery	of	important	modes	of	theology	very	much	lost	in	the	modern	period.	The	close	
relation	 between	 ethics	 and	 spirituality	 resonates	 with	 specifically	 contemporary	
																																																													
49	He	compares	the	soul/body	relation	to	that	of	God	and	humanity,	even	while	rejecting	an	“instrumental”	
view	of	human	nature.	See	Maximus,	Ambiguum	7:	“God	becomes	to	the	soul	(and	through	the	soul	to	the	
body)	what	the	soul	is	to	the	body,	as	God	alone	knows	…	He	remains	wholly	man	in	soul	and	body	by	nature,	
and	becomes	wholly	God	in	body	and	soul	by	grace	and	by	the	unparalleled	divine	radiance	of	blessed	glory	
appropriate	to	him.”	“The	body	is	of	such	a	nature	that	it	can	make	place	for	the	soul	by	an	inherent	power	that	
is	receptive	to	the	soul’s	activity.”	In	On	the	Cosmic	Mystery	of	Jesus	Christ,	trans.	Paul	Blowers	and	Robert	
Wilken	(Crestwood,	NY:	St.	Vladimir’s	Seminary	Press,	2003),	71.		
50	Coakley,	“Kenosis	and	Subversion”,	34.	
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concerns.	 Finally,	 her	 catholic	 hermeneutic	 of	 integration	 and	patristic	 ressourcement	 of	
central	Christian	 thematics	 re‐ordered	 to	directly	 speak	 to	contemporary	 cultural	 issues	
overcomes	the	weightless	or	un‐tethered	elements	of	contemporary	theological	feminism	
without	losing	focus	on	its	agenda.		
	
In	 terms	 of	 her	 Christological	 vision,	 it	 is	 worth	 questioning	 whether	 Coakley	
resonates	 too	 much	 with	 a	 difficult	 element	 of	 Rahner’s	 “supernatural	 existential”,	
specifically	its	de	facto	“banalization”	of	religious	experience	and	religious	praxis	(making	
mundane	 human	 experience	 “spiritual”).	 That	 is,	 there	 is	 a	 question	whether	 Coakley’s	
specific	spiritual	re‐engagement	of	kenōsis	in	Christology	would	tend	to	reduce	“authentic	
spirituality”	 to,	 as	 in	 Rahner,	 a	 subject’s	 vague	 awareness	 of	 transcendence	 and	 then	
delimit	the	total	demand	of	the	Gospel	upon	one’s	entire	being.	Is	the	call	to	action	and	the	
demand	for	conversion	“watered	down”	by	a	fear	of	the	historical	(and	terrible,	no	doubt)	
legitimation	of	violent	patriarchical	power	structures?		
	
At	any	rate	the	final	verdict	on	Coakley’s	Christology	is	still	out;	we	must	wait	upon	
more	 thoroughly	 developed	 Christological	 reflection	 from	 this	 important	 contemporary	
theologian,	which	will	only	come	as	the	trajectory	inscribed	in	her	project	bears	itself	out.	
Only	 from	 the	 vantage	 of	 the	 total	 telos	 of	 her	 project	 can	 the	 question	 of	 which	 is	
fundamentally	 prior,	 nature	 or	 grace,	 be	 answered.	 A	 final	 assessment	 can	 only	 be	
attempted	then.	The	central	point	to	be	made—for	at	least	I	can	raise	the	proper	queries	
here—is	that	Coakley,	as	we	have	seen,	elects	a	certain	“Antiochene”	duality	over	against	a	
(supposedly)	Cyrilline	stress	on	unity	for	the	same	reason:	any	stress	on	an	Alexandrian	
Christology	drastically	debilitates	creaturely	self‐integrity	and	the	self‐determination	that	
defines	 it.	 Pointing	 out	 (as	 I	 did	 above)	 her	 facile	 opposition	 between	 Antiochene	
(emphasizing	 the	 humanity)	 and	 Alexandrian	 (supposedly	 denigrating	 it)	 Christologies,	
can	open	up	for	us	the	further	conclusion,	after	Riches,	that	the	concrete	union	operated	
by	 Christ’s	 hypostatic	 incarnation	 cannot	 be	 approached	 from	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 a	
conviction	or	thesis	about	the	general	relation	of	the	divine	and	human	natures	(as	in,	say,	
a	metaphysics	 of	 creation).	 Any	 general	 conviction	 about	 human	 nature,	 even	 one	with	
feminist	 concerns,	 must	 be	 rethought	 through	 Christology,	 not	 the	 other	 way	 around.	
Otherwise,	 our	 understanding	 of	 humanity	 will	 be	 extrinsic	 to	 Christ,	 and	 our	
understanding	 of	 Christ	 will	 be	 in	 danger	 of	 being	 itself	 “extrinsicist.”51	 What	 this	
observation	 seems	 to	 suggest	 is	 that	 Coakley’s	 narrative	 of	 modern	 Christological	
problematic	 (shared	 with	 Rahner),	 in	 which	 an	 over‐Cyrilline	 stress	 dominates	 and	
threatens	to	overcome,	breach,	circumvent,	or	“obliterate”	(to	use	her	word)	the	integrity	
of	the	creaturely	nature,	can	only	avoid	a	disastrous	elision	into	a	Eutychean	confusion	of	
divine	 and	 creaturely	 natures	 by	 a	 (quasi‐)Nestorian	 response.	 For	 both	 Coakley	 and	
																																																													
51	At	any	rate,	such	a	dualism	is	offset	in	Rahner	to	the	degree	that	his	constructive	response	attempts	to	find	
the	fullness	of	humanity	starting	from	the	hypostatic	union.	It	seems	that	this	is	precisely	where	he	differs	
from	Coakley.	Though	their	account	of	the	problem	is	the	same	(a	de	facto	monophysitism),	Rahner’s	concern	
to	reject	a	“pure	nature”	(though	perhaps	returning	with	abandon	because	of	his	rejection	of	a	thoroughgoing	
Christological	shape	to	theological	anthropology)	allows	his	Christological	proposal	to	reach	the	measure	of	
the	Lubacian	paradox	at	points.	“The	only	way	in	which	Christ’s	concrete	humanity	may	be	conceived	of	in	
itself	as	diverse	from	the	Logos	is	by	thinking	of	it	in	so	far	as	it	is	united	to	the	Logos.	The	unity	with	the	Logos	
must	constitute	it	in	its	diversity	from	him,	that	is,	precisely	as	a	human	nature;	the	unity	must	itself	be	the	
ground	of	the	diversity”	(“Current	Problems,”	181;	cf.	also	p.162).	One	should	also	see	Jon	Sobrino,	Jesus	the	
Liberator:	A	Historical‐Theological	Reading	of	Jesus	of	Nazareth	trans.	Paul	Burns	and	Francis	McDonagh	
(Mayknoll,	NY:	Orbis	Books,	2006),	240‐ff,	for	another	development	of	the	Rahnerian	starting	point.	Sobrino	
self‐consciously	subscribes,	however,	to	an	assumptionist	Christology.			
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Rahner	(and,	actually,	Nestorius),	 it	 is	the	desire	to	maintain	and	promote	the	difference	
between	 the	 divine	 and	 human,	 primarily	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 integrity	 and	 goodness	 of	
creaturely	 nature,	 that	 results	 still	 in	 a	 dualist	 Christology,	 expressed	 in	 Coakley,	 for	
example,	as	the	demand	for	a	“concurrence”	as	a	starting	point	for	articulating	the	relation	
of	the	two	natures.	It	could	be	suggested	that	the	parallelistic	Christological	proposals	of	
Coakley	(and	Rahner)	is	first	rooted	in	her	particular	parallelistic	conceptions	of	the	divine	
and	human	relation	in	general,	as	opposed	to	Riches’—following	Maximus—concentration	
on	the	concrete	data	of	biblical	revelation.	In	this	way	the	Christological	concentration	of	
theology	is	foiled	by	a	“competitive”	view	of	the	relation	of	God	and	creature	which	loses	
the	key	insight	at	the	heart	of	Chalcedon	itself.	
	
CONCLUSION: THE FRAME OF THE QUESTION 
	
We	 can	 wholeheartedly	 agree	 with	 Coakley	 that	 the	 enigma	 of	 Chalcedon	 is	 itself	 an	
invitation	 to	 constructive,	 albeit	 dogmatic,	 theology.	 In	 fact	 one	 should	 say	 that	 the	
dogmatic	 horos	 is	 the	 very	 locus	 for	 the	 greatest	 freedom	 for	 speculative	 Christology.	
Accordingly,	then,	one	must	also	follow	much	of	what	Riches	has	said	above,	particularly	
his	development	of	Coakley’s	conception	of	horos	as	encounter	(already	latent	in	Coakley’s	
work).	But	one	must	opt	for	Riches’	Cyrilline‐Maximian	interpretation	of	Chalcedon	for	the	
most	 important	 reason	 that	 the	 implication,	 discovered	 in	 its	 light,	 that	 Coakley’s	
“confected”	 Christology	 is	 still,	 at	 present,	 too	 redolent	 of	 a	 “pure	 nature”	 (probably	
resulting	 from	 a	 strong	 but	 latent	 influence	 of	 Rahner	 on	 her	 thought,	 along	 with	 the	
particular	 difficulties	 still	 being	 worked	 out	 within	 feminist	 discourse)	 which,	 after	 de	
Lubac,	only	 tends	 to	 lose	any	 stable	 conception	of	 that	which	 it	 seeks	most	 to	preserve,	
and	 therefore,	 in	 the	 long	run,	may	actually	 tend	 to	perform	the	very	opposite	effect	 for	
the	meaning	of	human	integrity	and	freedom	than	Coakley	intends.	Let	us	summarize	the	
point	by	quoting	David	Burrell,	who	says	that	proper	“attention	to	creation	and	the	unique	
relation	of	creator	to	creatures	can	eliminate	the	tendency	to	structure	divine	and	human	
freedom	as	a	zero‐sum	game,	for	that	very	structure	simply	presumes	that	the	creator	is	
an	actor	along	with	others,	as	does	the	language	of	‘concurrence’.”52		
	
Finally,	 one	must	 say,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 enigma	 of	 Chalcedon	 is	 best	 approached	
when	 understood	 in	 developmental	 continuity	 with	 Constantinople	 III,	 and	 therefore	
consider	 dyothelitism,	 paradoxically,	 as	 an	 important	 development	 of	 an	 Alexandrian	
Chalcedon.	 Yet	 I	 must	 ask:	 Is	 the	 enigma	 of	 Chalcedon	 hereby	 “solved”?	 One	 must	
vigorously	agree	with	Coakley’s	profound	 insight	 that	Chalcedon,	 even	 read	 through	 the	
lens	 of	 later	 dogmatic	 development,	 is	 only	 still	an	 invitation	 to	 reflection:	 the	 essential	
issues	raised	are	in	no	way	resolved.	Rather,	it	is	only	here	that	the	essential	questions	of	
Christology	can	first	properly	be	asked.	What	matters	is	the	articulation	of	the	salvation	of	
humanity	 by	 means	 of	 the	 hypostatic	 union	 that	 precisely	 as	 union	 expresses	 the	
difference	of	humanity	from	divinity,	and	thereby,	again,	precisely	as	union,	manifests	the	
full	 integrity	 of	 human	 creatureliness	 to	 its	widest	 possible	 extent.	 Christology	properly	
refuses	at	all	costs	to	let	go	of	an	affirmation	of	both	poles	of	the	antinomy	and	shows	how	
the	affirmation	of	one	(unity)	is	the	means	toward	the	affirmation	of	the	other	(difference)	
as	a	result	of	the	concrete	Christological	account	of	grace	(divine	action)	and	the	resulting	
																																																													
52	See	David	Burrell,	“Creator/Creatures	Relation:	‘The	Distinction’	vs.	‘Onto‐theology’”	Faith	and	Philosophy	25	
(2008):	184.		
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account	of	human	and	creaturely	nature	in	its	definitive	and	intrinsic	relation	with	divine	
nature.	God	and	creature	live,	ultimately,	according	to—in	Kathy	Tanner’s	break‐through	
phrase—a	“non‐competitive”	mode	of	relation	that	is	built	into	the	creation	itself	as	rooted	
in	God	and	which	Christ	makes	explicit	in	his	incarnation.53	The	potential	of	such	a	model	
is	clear	for	concerns	that	are	generally	humanist	(as	Riches	masterfully	adumbrated	in	his	
essay).	Does	it	come,	however,	with	a	particularly	feminist	vision?	We	can	suggest	that	this	
will	 be	 the	 case,	 but	 it	will	 be	properly	 approached	only	 insofar	 as	 a	 feminist	 project	 is	
recognized	 to	 be	 necessarily	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 humanist	 one	 understood	 within	 a	
Christological	 vision	 that	 is	 soteriological	 through	and	 through.	To	 raise	 the	question	of	
the	 feminine,	 one	 must	 understand	 the	 Christian	 proposal	 of	 the	 human	 as	 such	
(otherwise	“feminism”	is	only	conscripting	theology	and	the	Christian	faith	as	useful	tools	
for	its	own	“political”	ends).	If	Christ	is	the	essence	of	the	latter,	he	is,	however	strangely,	
the	answer	to	the	former.	Here	the	 lines	of	Chalcedonian	Christology	 intrinsically	unfold	
for	reflection	toward	Mary	of	Nazareth,	the	Mother	of	God,	whose	womb	is	“wider	than	the	
heavens,”	 Platytera	 ton	 Ouranon.54	 The	 “theological	 exigency”	 of	 difference	 within	 the	
creaturely	realm	is	grounded	in	the	creator‐creature	relation,	of	which	such	difference	is	a	
“non‐identical	repetition,”	a	pleonasm,	or	better,	an	icon—or,	on	the	other	hand,	 like	the	
concept	of	“pure	nature,”	an	abstraction,	nothing	at	all.55			
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53	For	her	very	important	notion	of	“non‐competitive	relations,”	see	for	example,	Kathryn	Tanner,	Jesus,	
Humanity	and	the	Trinity:	A	Brief	Systematic	Theology	(Minneapolis:	Fortress	Press,	1998).			
54	I	refer	here	to	the	image	of	the	Virgin	Orans,	also	called	Our	Lady	of	the	Sign,	The	Sign	or	Plytetera,	which	
shows	the	Virgin	in	the	orans	position,	hands	lifted	in	prayer,	with	the	infant	Christ	circumscribed	by	an	
aureole	that	symbolizes	her	womb.	It	is	often	placed	on	the	half‐dome	directly	above	the	altar	in	Orthodox	and	
Byzantine	Rite	Catholic	Churches.	It	articulates	here	what	concepts	can	only	stutter.	
55	Thanks	are	due	to	the	anonymous	reviewers	of	the	Australian	eJournal	of	Theology	as	well	as	its	editor.	The	
author	would	like	to	thank	especially	theologians	Paul	Jones	and	Shelly	Poe,	who	read	and	profoundly	
critiqued	a	much	earlier	version	of	the	essay	of	which	this	fragment	originally	formed	a	part	–	I	believe	in	
2009.		
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